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Oral, but Oral What? The Nomenclatures
of Orality and Their Implications
David Henige
I
When I fi rst noticed the announcement of the impending 
appearance of a journal to be named Oral Tradition, I was intrigued 
and gratifi ed. As a historian I looked forward to welcoming a scholarly 
journal which would be devoted entirely to addressing issues of interest 
to students of oral societies, be they of the present or the past. When I 
later saw a list of the members of the Editorial Board, I was disappointed 
and disquieted to fi nd not a single historian among them.
But as I contemplated what seemed an unwelcome turn of events, 
I realized that my fi rst reaction had been refl exive and had been based 
on a perception which was neither mainstream nor necessarily beyond 
cavil. It seemed in fact that the issue had two distinct levels: one was 
that of nomenclature, the other a matter of attitude and operation. The 
two levels are hardly discrete, however; a great deal of osmosis takes 
place between them. On these grounds perhaps a few words on each 
might be in order, if only to initiate what could be a useful (and, I would 
argue, needed) colloquy.
In the past twenty-fi ve years of so, “orality” has come into its 
own as a legitimate fi eld of concern in a number of disciplines, including 
history—both the history of oral societies in various parts of the world 
and of the “underside” of contemporary history in “western” societies. 
It has also become of great interest to scholars in literature, psychology, 
anthropology, philosophy, and several other fi elds. It is no surprise then 
that, along the way, a number of distinct (and not so distinct) terms have 
sprung up to denote the various bodies of data being studied; but few, if 
any, of these
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have managed either to capture the day or to convey unambiguously 
their focus and intent.
For instance, the terms “oral data” and “oral materials” are 
frequently used in one context or another, but have never been able to 
establish an out-of-context domain of their own in the lexicography. 
Perhaps they are too general, too vague, or simply too drab formulations 
to be able to live a life of their own successfully.
“Oral literature” on the other hand appears to be used quite 
frequently to describe—what? Anything from the Iliad and the Odyssey, 
known to us only in their written forms, to oral recitations which, if 
ever written down at all, have been committed to writing only by 
modern students interested in them. “Oral literature” has also been used 
to describe the entire spectrum from unabashed stories, with no other 
aim but the amusement of the moment, to purportedly historical texts 
wielded for political advantage from one generation to the next. Finally, 
the term suffers an additional double handicap. It is oxymoronic to those 
etymologically inclined, who object that, by defi nition, “literature” 
cannot be oral; therefore there can be no “oral literature.”
This is a quibble, worth mentioning but not worrying about, but 
the second handicap is more serious, at least from the point of view of the 
historian. This is the fact that historians, although they often (although 
perhaps not often enough) use written literature as historical sources, 
almost always fail to consider the literary (and indeed the oral) aspects 
of more explicitly historical sources (chronicles, biographies, narrative 
accounts of the past, and the like). That is, they neglect to place such 
writings of the past into their particular ambiances in order better to 
appreciate the conventions that governed their creation and form. The 
result is often either needless anachronism, undue credulity, or both.
“Oral poetry” at least is a term that is relatively clearly defi ned, 
to the extent, that is, that “poetry” itself is able to conjure images of a 
genre of expression with specifi c aims and particular forms. Here one 
problem is that, while many historians defi ne “poetry” in such a way as 
practically to eliminate examples of it as potentially useful historical 
sources, many societies do not. Yet no source has been more thoroughly 
plumbed for possible historical content than the Iliad. So there is a 
paradox here as well.
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Conversely, and somewhat oddly perhaps, “oral history” seems 
to be the single term that has managed to secure for itself a distinctive 
niche in this nomenclatural welter—odd, because in doing so it has 
given the term “history” an unusual new twist. To almost everyone, 
practitioners and observers alike, “oral history” nowadays refers to 
the practice of eliciting life histories, personal reminiscences from 
participants in events of note or simply from everyday people whose 
views, it is thought, can provide a needed antidote to an overly elitist 
perspective in most historiography. In this sense then, “oral history” 
scarcely deals with the past at all, but only with the length and breadth 
of the present generation.1
Finally we reach the term “oral tradition,” to which I will give 
more extended attention, if only because my own background permits 
it and because it is the most widely—and variously—used term in the 
fi eld. As an Africanist historian by training, interested in how non-literate 
societies were able (if able at all) to preserve memories of their past, I 
have probably been most infl uenced by the defi nition of “oral tradition” 
propounded by Jan Vansina in his book of the same name.2 Trained as a 
medievalist, Vansina recognized that oral materials could be of potential 
value to historians, whether proverbs, poetry/songs, lengthy historicized 
texts, or epics. He urged historians to regard these materials in much 
the same way as they had traditionally regarded written documents—
as capable of being exploited for both direct and indirect historical 
information.
Numberless historians during the next two decades, in Africa 
and elsewhere, followed this advice as they swarmed out among oral 
(or formerly oral) societies, collecting “texts” and subjecting them 
to analysis. In this process they developed both new views as to the 
historicity of the oral past and new ways and means of collecting and 
interpreting oral data, whatever their apparent nature. Responding to, 
and benefi ting from, all this work, Vansina revised (or rather rewrote) 
his text, and in doing so provided it with a new title, Oral Tradition as 
History, to emphasize that he felt that the work done in the intervening 
twenty-fi ve years had authenticated the use of oral materials as historical 
sources.3 Even so, in Oral Tradition as History, Vansina defi ned oral 
traditions as “documents of the present” which “also embody a message 
from the past,” recognizing the ineluctably Manichaean duality that 
bedevils oral data when treated as historical sources.4
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I have myself tried to delimit “oral tradition(s)” as a genre by 
arguing that, regardless of their historicity, to qualify for that sobriquet, 
materials should have been transmitted over several generations and to 
some extent be the common property of a group of people.5 I did this 
primarily in order to distinguish it from “testimony,” which, by virtue 
of being the property of only a few individuals, seemed to me to lack 
the cachet (if sometimes dubious) that widespread belief and common 
acceptance grant to “oral tradition.” Other historians have also given 
specifi c attention to defi ning “oral tradition” but few, if any, have used 
in their own work other terms to characterize the materials with which 
they have worked.
While the term has thus gained the overwhelming loyalty of 
historians, it is only one of many terms used by other students of orality. 
And when used by these latter, more often than not “oral tradition” 
refers to matter whose historical value is minimal. In other words, when 
the term appears in print, it becomes necessary to know who is using it 
in order to understand how it is likely to be intended. And while such 
a circumstance is frequently the case in scholarly discourse, this is by 
itself no reason why it should be ignored as a problem.
II
But nomenclatural diffi culties often betray more substantive 
differences among those who seek greater or lesser truths. In fact 
such diffi culties can be regarded as windows on less visible issues, 
in this case the disparity of attitudes towards oral materials. And here 
differences among disciplines come directly into play. Any text, whether 
it be written, oral, or even visual, is likely to provide different stimuli, 
depending on the needs and goals of those consulting it. In this respect 
it is possible to see marked differences in the ways that historians and 
others (to make a purely invidious dichotomy) treat, or wish to treat, 
oral materials.
Most historians commit themselves to seek their ends by 
attempting to understand as much as they can about what happened in 
the past and then by explaining why just those things happened and not 
any number of other things. In order to accomplish this, of course, they 
need fi rst to discover sources for past events in which they can believe, 
and after that to ransack these sources for every bit of information that 
they construe (rightly or wrongly) as referring, directly or indirectly, to 
events
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that actually took place, people who really existed, conditions that 
actually prevailed. Because of this primary goal6 they tend to look at 
oral data quite differently, and in fact, often quite contrarily to, say, 
literary scholars.
The latter are intensely interested in such things as habits of 
expression or intimations of creative behavior or the effects of audience 
response. On the other hand historians—wrongly in most cases, I 
think—are reluctant to deal with any of these issues or ones like them. 
For instance, they can hardly—or should hardly—address the effects 
of performance on an oral text without confronting the inevitable, and 
inevitably unwelcome, results that such ruminations have on the goal of 
coming into contact with a real past. Ironically, although the bread and 
butter of historical inquiry is to discern and explain change, historians 
cannot abide the possibility of indeterminable changes in their own 
sources.
For historians, then, the vaunted superiority of the written word is 
less owing to their belief that somehow the ability to write enhances the 
ability to perceive and record the truth, than it is to the fact that, whether 
“right” or “wrong,” the written word remains comfortingly unchanging 
over time, even if the ability to interpret it well often changes.
Historians who wish to believe in the historicity of the Trojan 
War must regard the Iliad either as dating from a time very close to such 
an event or as having been transmitted for several centuries virtually 
unchanged.7 Conversely, literary historians seldom believe that they 
have grounds for the second belief and so, while they might not reject the 
notion that the Iliad has a germ of more or less accurate recollection of a 
“Trojan War,” they would not be fain to suggest that this germ—even if 
it could be isolated—would be likely to serve as an accurate marker of 
specifi c historical events.8 For them the Iliad is interesting above all as 
a literary, or rather literizing, composition, possibly as the culmination 
of a long period of orality which fi nally coalesced (with the “how” 
being more important than the “when” though hardly separated from 
it) into written form. For historians, the poem’s value depends almost 
entirely on the extent to which they can tease out what they regard as 
specifi c historical information. And this in turn involves posing a largely 
differing set of questions.
In a sense this brings us back to the matter of nomenclature. For, 
if historians are pleased to argue that the Iliad can tell us something 
substantial about a place called Ilium in a time about
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the beginning of the twelfth century B.C., they would portray it as 
“oral tradition” because it managed to convey historical information 
over some period of time to a point at which it was recorded. In that 
respect it was not unlike the kinds of information historians collect (or 
like to think they collect) in oral societies. To the extent that they grant 
historical value to the Iliad, they are also granting validity to the results 
of their own work.
But if the argument is accepted that, whatever historical insights 
the Iliad might provide, they relate to contemporary, probably eighth-
century B.C., times, then historians—if I read them right—would think 
of the Iliad, or at least parts of it, as “oral literature,” or even “oral 
history.” It may have been widely known, but it was not transmitted 
as an unchanging text over any period of time (and so should probably 
not be referred to as “it”. . .). By changing, by becoming a text more 
infl uenced by a continuing present than by a receding past, any oral 
Iliad forfeits being termed “oral tradition,” as historians are accustomed 
to use the term.
A further nomenclatural issue with procedural implications 
relates to the effects that the mere passing of time might have on 
terminology. To take one example, historians in the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries (and in some cases the twentieth century) regarded much 
of the Icelandic saga literature as historical, and therefore as having 
been “oral tradition.” Nowadays the tendency is to regard much of this 
material—that which dealt with Scandinavia rather than Iceland—as 
less an attempt to record and preserve the past accurately than as a 
form of literary expression that used real or putative historical events as 
points of departure—raisons d’être for literary composition, not unlike 
the Iliad or the Chanson de Roland or the Puranic texts of early India.
It proved diffi cult for nineteenth-century Nordic historians to 
reject the sagas and their counterparts as essentially historical texts 
because they wanted very much to believe what they said—nationalism 
served well to dull their critical faculties. As a result not a few intellectual 
gymnastics went into attempting to demonstrate how oral societies could, 
and did, go to great lengths to train specialists whose only function was 
to receive, memorize, and transmit in unchanged form stories (or, if 
you will, records) from the ever more remote and meaningless past.9 
As nationalism, at least Nordic nationalism, ebbed in this century, some 
historians, but more often literary critics, demonstrated the exiguity of 
this
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point of view.10 Consequently, the general (but hardly universal) belief 
today is that it is not really possible, however desirable, to posit a long 
history of unifi ed kingship in, say, Sweden before the tenth century on 
the basis of the Ynglinga saga or similar compositions of much later 
provenance.11
III
These hard lessons resulted from, among other things, the 
greater—or at least the quicker—willingness of literary scholars to 
drink from the cup of comparison by drawing on work from one time or 
place in order to suggest tenable hypotheses for studying another time 
and place. Perhaps owing to the great mass of documentation available 
for their perusal, historians were rather less interested and less willing to 
draw on work done outside their own specialized interests, particularly 
if carried out among “primitive” societies. After all, they had sources 
galore which seemed quite capable of speaking for themselves after a 
little prodding. Of what possible interest could work in darkest Africa 
have for historians of Anglo-Saxon England (to cite but one of any 
number of possible permutations)? Indeed it was (and still is) common 
to regard historians of oral societies as species of anthropological 
wolf in sheep’s clothing. Although not yet fully dead and buried, this 
notion has begun to give way to accepting the value of understanding 
not only the work of other historians in apparently remote pastures, but 
also of scholars from other disciplines, once thought of as bearing little 
relationship to historical inquiry.
But much remains to be done, and it still is not easy to see where 
the most likely meeting ground would be in this confl ict of opinion. 
The differences are not only procedural but broadly philosophical as 
well. No group of scholars willingly rejects its sources, and historians 
are no exception. Moreover, as I suggested earlier, seeing at least some 
oral texts as fundamentally unhistorical, because of their propensity to 
change as time passes, undermines an entire ethic that has developed in at 
least one group of oral historians in the past few scholarly generations.12 
But, if a meeting of minds is not in the cards, a colloquy in which the 
respective arguments are made on behalf of, and as a result of input 
from, all contending parties is likely at least to crystallize discussion, 
eliminate the wearying repetition of stale arguments, and introduce 
comparative insights and issues.13
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To this end the appearance of Oral Tradition, which promises 
to be eclectic in its content and approach, and which, it is hoped, will 
attract an audience at least as eclectic in its interests, bodes well for 
continuing and intensifying the study of oral data from and about the 
past, no matter what we care to call them. In its pages psychologists will 
be able to talk to historians, historians to literary critics, literary critics 
to Biblical scholars. . . . The present piece is intended as no more than an 
introductory salvo to such a polylog, and in it I hope that I have raised 
points that will strike the interest of all parties.
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Notes
1Not that oral history is entirely without its problems in this respect. See, for instance, 
Morrissey 1984. However, the International Journal of Oral History seldom belies its title by 
publishing studies which fall outside this more or less contemporary framework, particularly 
insofar as they relate to anti-elitist life histories.
2See Vansina 1965. 
3See Vansina 1985.
4Vansina 1985:xii, with emphasis in the original.
5See Henige 1982:2-3.
60f course some historians have become as interested in why their sources say what 
they (appear to) say as in that which is said, but this welcome departure cannot yet be said to be 
a trend, either among practitioners of oral history or among historians of oral societies. Perhaps 
it will never be, since in this case historians are co-creators of their own sources, a fact that is 
bound to inhibit their willingness—and certainly their ability—to question them as they might 
another body of materials.
7Whereas the Homeric compositions have been unceasingly subjected to scrutiny (not 
always critical scrutiny of course) for two centuries or more, the Vedic hymns and Puranic texts 
from early India have largely been the subject of pious attention, and the belief is still nearly 
universal that these texts (particularly the Vedic hymns) were “carried down in the memory for 
thousands of years” before being written down in precisely the form in which they had first been 
composed (see Roy 1977:8). Probably because the Vedic materials are regarded as scriptures, all 
arguments have been on their behalf rather than on behalf of the balance of evidence. For other 
studies on this issue, see Majumdar 1952:225-41. These discussions occur in a methodological 
vacuum, untainted by work done on similar materials. Consequently the same assertions and the 
same arguments recur endlessly.
8See Morris 1986.
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9The idea that oral societies were typically interested enough in preserving and 
transmitting the details of an ever-growing and more cumbersome record of the past to create 
such classes of specialists to do just this was (is) of course not confined to Scandinavia, but 
was a part of the posture of accepting oral data as historically accurate in Oceania, parts of 
Africa, India, and elsewhere. It is a belief that can never be demonstrated, but a useful belief 
nonetheless.
10Early in this century Lauritz Weibull was one of the first to cast into doubt the 
intrinsic historical value of the Heimskringla and other sagas, and in so doing he aroused heated 
animosity on the part of his colleagues who did not care to have their illusions assaulted by 
means of textual criticism. See Arvidsson et al. 1977, and more generally, Kristjánsson 1975.
11The views on the Vedic and Puranic materials mentioned in note 7 are much imbued 
with the idea of Indian nationalism and/or Aryan purity and seem to reflect quite closely both 
the content and inspiration of the debate in Scandinavia and elsewhere in the nineteenth century. 
Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.
12I refer to the dismayingly large number of Africanist historians who are determined 
to believe whatever their oral sources seem to tell them and to compound the problem by 
declining to place these materials into the public domain where they belong. On this point see 
Henige 1980.
13Several interesting studies which demonstrate the efficacy of the multi-disciplinary 
approach are to be found in Congrès 1983.
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